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Introduction
The population of the Republic of Ireland is now 3.2 million,
just about the same as it was in 1921 when the new State was about to be
formed. From the perspective of other European countries, the remark-
.
able thing about this is the absence of growth, since every other European
country has experienced a significant rise in population in this period:
even in Northern Ireland, which I shall consider later in the paper, the
population is now more than one?fifth greater than in 1921. But on the
other hand, from the perspective of Ireland in the 1950s, when population
was declining rapidly - reaching a low point of 2.8 million in 1961 - few
peopl~ would have confidently envisaged restoration of the population to its
¯ 1921 level within such a comparatively short number of years.
The major determinant of Ireland’s unusual population ex-
perience has been emigration, which in turn has been chiefly influenced by
the search for jobs abroad that were not available at home. In this paper,
I shall first outline the past record of employment creation in the Republic
of Ireland. Part II considers the varying policy approaches that were
adopted. In Part III, the employment experience in Northern Ireland is
discussed. In the concluding part, I try to draw some lessons from the
past which I hope will prove r.elevant to your work in the rest of the Course
when you turn your minds to the present and prospective situation.
I. The Employment Record
The first comprehensive employment figures after indepen-
dence relate to 1926, and in that year there were 1.22 million recorded at
work in the area now known as the Republic of Ireland. Fifty years later,
in 1976, recorded employment was 1.04 million, so that there was a dee-
line of nearly 200, 000 over this period. Most of the fall occurred in the
1950s: in the decade 1951-61, there was a net loss of 165, 000 jobs. Other-
wise the total level of employment has been static, except for the recent
world depression when there was an aggregate net loss’of about 30, 000 jobs
in the two years 1974-75.
* I should like to thank, Tony Foley for his dedicated research assistance on
this paper, told the following for their helpful comments on an earlier draft:
Finola Ke~medy, Brendan Menton, Jim O’Brien, R. O’Connor and R. N. Vaughan.
.The aggregate change in employment has been accompanied
by vast structural changes, as shown in Table 1. Agricultural employment
is now less than two-fifths of its level fifty years ago. This has involved a
net decline in agricultural employment of more than 400, 000 - much greater
than the overall loss of jobs. Industrial employment doubled, and employ-
ment in services increased moderately.
Over time, the sectoral changes in employment have.varied
considerably. The fact that total employment remained roughly constant
between 1926 and 1946 as against a significant fall in the period since World
War II owes much to the different rate of decline in agriculture in the two
periods. From 1926-46, the fall in agricultural employment amounted on
average to a little over 4, 000 per annum, compared with an average of
11,000 per ammm in the post-war period. Two major factors involved
were the depression of the 1930s and the world war, both of which greatly
reduced emigration in general, and the outflow from agriculture in particular.
¯ Outside agriculture, employment rose substantially from
1926-46 in industry, and to a moderate degree in services. The major
element of expansion was in manufacturing industry in the years 1932-36
as a result of the introduction of widespread protection. At the same time,
there was considerable expansion in construction, including housing, and
later, during the war, in turf production.
With the return to normality after the war, and with high
employment prevailing in Britain, it was almost inevitable that there would
be substantial acceleration in the rate of employment decline in various
activities in Ireland. This, in fact, is what happened; In the five-year
period 1946-51, agricultural employment fell by 14, 000 per annum. In
private domestic service - another activity where employment was tem-
porarily sustained because of depression and warm- the annual rate of
decline trebled to 3,000 per annum. As fuel supplies from abroad became
more readily accessible the numbers engaged in turf production fell considerably.
Given these enormous reductions, the even more remarkable
feature of the period 1946-51 is that overall employment only fell slightly.
This was because of an industrial boom in that period when industrial em-
ployment expanded by 11,000 jobs per annum - greater than in any other
inter-censal period before or since. A major h~fluence was the increase
in construction activity stimulated by fiscal policy aimed at the provision
of much-needed social m~d infrastructural facilities. But more than half
the extra jobs came in manufacturing. True there were numerous special
.Table 1
Aggregate and Sectoral Employment in the Republic of Ireland,
Various Dates~ 1926-..1976"
1926
1936
1946
1951
1961
1966
1971
1974
1975
1976 "
Total EconomyI AgricuitureI Industry I Services
(i) Numbers (000)
1,219.5
1,235.3
1,225.7
1,217.1
1,052.5
1,066.0
1,054.8
i, 066
i, 050
I, 035
652.2
613.0
567.3
497.8
379.9
333.5
273 .i
254
252
243
162.4
206.4
224.9
280.6
257.2
293.7
322.7
331
315
304~
404.9
415.9
4
433 .’5
438.7
415.4
438.7
459.0
481
483
488
(ii) Average Afmual Growth Rates (%)
1926-36 0.1
-0.6 2.4 0.3
1936-46 -0.1
-0.7 0.9 0.4
1946-51 -0.1
-2.6 4.5 0.2
1951-61
-1.4 -2.7
-0.9 -0.5
1961-66 0.3
-2.6 2.7 1.1
1966-71 -0.2
-3.9 1.9 0.9
1971-74 0.4 -2.4 0.9 1.6
1974-76 -1.5
-2.2 -4.2 0.7
Full period
1926-76 -0.3 -2.0 1.3 0.4
(iii) Sectoral Shares in Total EmploymenL
1926 ¯ 100 53.5 13.3 33.2
1946 100 46.3 18.3 35.4
1966 100 31.3 27.6 41.2
1976 100 23.5 29.4 47.1
*Figures relate to April of each year.
Source: YAeran A. Kennedy, Productivity and Industrial Growth: The Irish
Expe~:ience (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971); Census of
Population of Ireland 1971, Vol.IK; and Department of Finance,
Economic Review and Outlook, June 1977.
.circumstances which have led some later writers to treat this expansion as
artificial and unsustainable. Extensive protection of home manufacturing
prevailed; demand on the home market was particularly buoyant, following
the release of pent-up demand from the war period and the post-war expan-
sionary fiscal raeasures; and there was a considerable boom in tourism
from Britain in the immediate post-war years due to the more abundant food
supplies here and currency restrictions on travel to non-sterling countries.
Nevertheless, the performance was impressive in terms of industrial em-
ployment, and contrasts sharply with the following decade when the policy
of fiscal expansion was curtailed.
In fact, as far as:employment is concerned, the 1950s rep-
resents the worst phase in the whole period since independence. In the
decade 1951-61 employment in agriculture continued to decline at the same
annual percentage rate (2½ per cent) as in the previous five-year period.
Since the rate applied to a reduced level, however, the absolute annual de-
cline was somewhat reduced to an average of under 12, 000 per annum. Had
employment outside agriculture continued to expand at the same rate as from
1951-61, total employment would have begun to rise. Instead both industry
and services contributed further to the overall decline.
The fall in total employment was arrested in the period
1961-66 and a small expansion took place. Agricultural employment con-
tinued to decline at the same percentage rate but now the average annual
numbers involved were reduced to just over 9, 000. The same phenomenon
was operative in private domestic service, where the average annual fall
was down to 1,300 for 1961-66 compared with 2,200 for 1951-61 and 3, 000
for 1946-51. Industrial employment rose considerably and there was also
a significant rise in services employment.
This happy state of affairs was not sustained in the following
five-year period, 1966-71, when the level of total employment declined
again - by an average of over 2, 000 per annum. A number of factors were
involved. First, the rate of outflow from agriculture accelerated sharply.
Had agricultural employment declined at the same annual percentage rate
as formerly in the post-war period (2½ per cent), this would have involved
a drop of 7, 000 jobs per annum on average. Instead the rate rose sharply
to 4 per cent per ammm, involving an average loss each year of over 1.2, 000
jobs. A similar experience took place in relation to private domestic ser-
vice, where employment fell by an average of 2,000 per mmum - well up on
the figure for the previous quinquennium. In addition, the rate of increase
in industrial employment was lower.
In the period April 1971 to April 1974, immediately prior to
the recent world depression, total employment rose slightly. But the rise
was due more to a reduction in the rate of decline in agricultural employ-
ment rather than to any acceleration in the growth of non-agricultural
employment. Indeed, the rate of increase in industrial employment declined
further, but this was offset by a rise in the growth of services employment
- most of it in public administration and defence and other public services
such as education and health. The major effects of the world depression
were felt in the period April 1974 to April 1976 when there was an overall
net decline of 30, 000 jobs. Industrial employment, in particular, was
severely affected, despite the new jobs created under the industrial
development programmes.
II. Policy Considerations
Having sketched the factual record, let us now turn to examine
the major influences underlying the actual employment experience. It had
been a major hope that the achievement of independence would give freedom
to devise and implement economic policies that would accelerate the develop-
ment of the economy and check the sustained drain oll population. For this
purpose, the need for industrial development was clearly recognised by
some of the leaders of the independence movement. Griffith was influenced
in this direction by Hungarian experience and by the ideas of the economist,
Friedrich List, who argued the need for tariff protection for "infant indus-
tries"; while other leaders, such as Connolly, looked to even more radical
methods.
The First Decade
Despite the obvious need for rapid industrialisation if
employment opportunities were to expand, few industries developed in the
first decade of independence. True~ there were some far-sighted initiatives,
such as the Shannon Electricity Scheme, but economic policy concentrated
predominantly on agricultural development - the slogan of the time being
"one more cow, one more sow, one more acre trader the plough". The
new Irish government took the view that the overall prosperity of the economy
depended on agriculture, and that the prosperity of agriculture depended on
the export market. This view was founded on the fact that the land provided
at
the only major known natural resource, that agriculture at the time accom~ted
directly for more than half of the labour force, while exports of live animals
and food amounted to three-quarters of total merchandise exports. More-
over, Britain provided a virtually unlimited outlet for livestock products.
The overriding aim of policy was to raise agricultural productivity and re-
duce farm costs so that Irish export sales would be competitive and provide
good returns to farmers. Particular stress was laid on improving the
quality of output and marketing arrangements, but no direct support of
agricultural prices was provided.
The policy, so far as it went, had considerable success.
While it was calculated to raise real income, however, it was unlikely to
generate enough new jobs without special measures to secure complemen-
tary development in industry, including, of course, agricultural processing.
Why then was there such delay in pursuing what seemed to be the accepted
nationalist approach to industrialisation? The following appear to be the
chief reasons. First, the Civil War and its aftermath put a premium on
rekestablishing stability, making drastic innovations in economic policy
less welcome. Second, in re-establishing stability, the government neces-
sarily relied on goodwill and moral support from the British government,
which might be eroded by an extensive network of tariffs that would mainly
affect British goods. Third, many of the leaders favouring industrialisa-
tion, such as Griffith and Connolly, were dead. Fourth, the victorious
party in the Civil War contained the more conservative elements and drew
support from the better-off farmers and the professional classes. These
were mflikely to benefit - in fact, they were likely to be worse-off - as a
result of the introduction of protective tariffs which would increase the
price of their consumer goods and the cost of some of their inputs. Fifth,
the industrial lobby was weak. The boundary of the new State was decided
on political considerations mid did not correspond to any desirable economic
or geographic entity: the major industries were largely located in the ex-
cluded six counties. Finally, the prevailing view among the great majority
of Irish economists then, and, in particular, among those advising the
government, strongly favoured the laissez faire philosophy. Indeed, it was
left largely to an English economist, none other than the great Keynes, to
defend the intl-oduction of industrial protection in Ireland. Delivering the
first Finlay Lecture at University College Dublin in April 1933, Keynes,
to the embarrassment of his hosts, expressed his sympathy with the new
governmentts approach to greater self-sufficiency: "let goods be homespun
.whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and,
1
finance be primarily national".
above all, let
The Thirties and Economic Nationalism
Mr deValera’s government, elected early in 1932, quicldy
embarked oll the encouragement of industrial development on a broad front
through tariff and quota protection. The objective was partly nationalistic
- to keep Irish production in Irish hands - but was also aimed at providing
employment and reducing emigration. It was accepted that, in the short-
term at least, protection might involve a lower standard of living but this
was judged a reasonable price to pay for maintaining a larger community
in Ireland. Mr deValera argued that "if the servant was displeased with
the Idcks of the master and wanted to have his freedom, he had to make up
his mind whether or not he was going to have that freedom, and give up the
luxuries of a certain kind which were available to him by being in that
mansion". And again that "we should get for our own people the neces-
saries of life and try to maintain our population" and that "we should forget
2as far as we can what are the standards prevalent in countries outside this".
/
Two events were important in wim~ing support for the new
policy: the Great Depression and the Economic War. The Depression,
however, was not so influential a factor in Ireland as in other coun-
tries in the switch to protection. Between 1929 and 1931, Ireland was
less hit than most countries, partly because of the absence of heavy industry
and the freedom of trade with its principal market, the United KAngdom,
but chiefly because the price of livestock, the main export, was well main-
rained until 1931: in fact, between 1929 and 1931 the terms of trade improved
for Ireland. The Economic War, which began in 1932, arose out of a dispute
between the deValera government and Lhe British government when the former
refused to continue payment of certain land mmuity payments which the
previous administration had accepted as being due to Britain. The British
government replied by imposing substantial duties on Irish exports of live-
stock and livestock produce as well as terminating Ireland’s exemption from
the general 10 per cent duty imposed under the Import Duties Act of 1932.
1. JoM Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency , Studies, June 1933.
It should be added, however, that Keynes warned of the’ dangers to be avoided
in the pursuit of economic nationalism, which he classified as Silliness,
Haste and Intolerance.
2. E. deValera, Fianna Fail and its Economic Policy_ (Dublin, 1928).
Quotas limiting Irish exports of livestock and livestock produce were im-
posed in Britain, effective from the beginning of 1934. The Irish govern-
ment retaliated with penal duties on certain British imports. The Economic
War lasted from 1932 to 1938 and, as one historiml put it, "the revival of
the old quarrel with England had created the atmosphere of emotional fervour
which he (i. e. deValera) needed for launching a drastic experiment in
l
economic nationalism".
r
¢
There are many criticisms of detail which might validly be
made against such hasty and indiscriminate use of protection. The sudden
introduction of prohibitive tariffs and quotas led to the proliferation of many
small establishments in each industry. These were sharing a relatively
small home market, which in many industries could at most justify only a
few firms if these were to operate at an efficient scale and have the pros-
pect of ultimately competing internationally. Also many of the new indus-
tries were engaged in relatively minor assembly operations of goods imported
in semi-finished form. .Yet while these and other criticisms can justifiably
be advanced, it remains true that the overall strategy made a great deal of
sense in the prevailing conditions. An export-oriented strategy was simply
not a feasible option at that time. There was little tradition of manufac--
turing enterprise, so that this had to be developed almost from scratch.
As experience generally SHOWS, including the results of the export strategy
adopted in the last two decades, it is difficult to expect new native enterprise
to launch quicldy into export markets without the learnhlg experience acquired
first through operating on the home market. This is so even at the best
of times: in the conditions of the 1930s it would have been next to impossible
given that the advanced countries generally were reverting to widespread
protection. Nor would it have been possible to rely extensively on the
other expedient adopted in the post-war period - attracting foreign enter-
prise - even if this were not incpmpatible with Mr deValera’s philosophy:
the Great Depression was not conducive to such enterprise, and besides the
multi-national idea was not as prevalent then as it later became.
The policy of protection, and associated measures such as
the Control of Mmmfactures Acts which limited foreig~a control, must be
credited with’the establishment of the great majority of the native private
enterprises existing today; and nothing comparable in the way of new
domestic enterprise lms been generated since then. The policy was also
1. W. K. Hancock, Sulwey of British Commomvealth Affairs, Vol.I
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), p.350.
,quite successful initially in expanding industrial employment. From 1931
to 1936, employment in transportable goods industries rose from 67 thousand
to 101 thousand - a rise of 50 per cent in five years. But for a variety of
reasons which I will not go into here, 1 productivity rose iittle. Moreover,
the uncertainty generated by the introduction of tariffs agahlst Irish goods
in Britain, for which the Economic War and the Irish policy of protection
were at least partly responsible, contributed to the loss of significant ex-
pansion possibilities in some industries. Ireland’s premier manuf~icturing
concern, Guinness, decided to open a brewery at Park Royal, near London,
in 1936 to safeguard its British market, while Ford’s decision in 1932 to
use the Cork plant only for home market assembly was influenced, inter
alia, by similar considerations.:
What about the other major possible avenue of development
- direct State involvement in production? The Cosgrave administration,
as already mentioned, had established the Electricity Supply Board in 1927
and some other State bodies as well, suOh as the Dairy Disposal Company
(1927) m~d the Agricultural Credit Corporation (1927). The 1930s saw the
establishment of the Sugar Company (1933) m~d Ceimici Teoranta (1934) in
manufacturing; while other new State bodies relating to productive activity
included the h~dustrial Credit Company (1933), Aer Lingus (1936), Aer
Rianta (1937), Irish Life Assurance (1939) and the Irish Tourist Board
(1939). Public expenditure on housing was also enlarged. It is fair to
say that the general approach was pragmatic, and the underlying ideology,
in so far as there was an ideology, was to establish State bodies only where
it was abundantly clear that private enterprise would not or could not operate.
Even on this criterion, however, some opportm~ities were missed, such as
the possibility of developing the fishing industry at a time when the costs,
in terms of opportunities foregone, were undoubtedly far less than today.
Moreover, some of the State bodies, such as the Tourist Board, operated
with a level of funding that made it difficult to achieve a major impact.
Land policy reflected the same, essentially conservative
approach - I use the term neutrally and not necessarily in a critical sense.
Division and reallocation of holdings continued on the basis of providing
small peasan~ proprietorships 1o Lhose of farming background - generally
in the same locality. The idea that land might be operated in other ways,
or by people with a non-farming backgrotmd, such as in collective enterprises
1. See Chapter 2 of my book, Productivity and Industrial Growth: the Irish
Experience (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971.).
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like the kibbutzim of Israel, was probably never even considered seriously.
No doubt this reflected political realities arising from the values of the vast
majority of the population. The government did, however, take initiatives
in encouraging the development of corn crops, fruit, vegetables, sugar beet,
and even, though unsuccessfully, tobacco.
As may be seen from Table 1, the overall level of employ-
ment was slightly higher in 1936 than in 1926, and this was the onlg4nter-
censal period since independence, apart from the five-year period 1961-66,
in which the levei of aggregate employment increased. This was not, of
course, simply the outcome of new job creation: another major influence
was the effect of the Great Depression on emigration, and hence on the
numbers remaining in agriculture. As employment conditions improved
abroad from about the mid-1930s, the outflow from agriculture increased.
Moreover, once the initial import-substitution phase was achieved in manu-
facturing, employment growth there was much more moderate, depending
pr.imarily on the growth of the home ma’rket. The final resolution of the
Economic War was achieved in 1938 with a set of agreements on defence,
financial and trade matters. The effect of the trade agreement in practice
was that Ireland had substantially free access to the British market while
retaining most of its own protective duties, though at a preferential rate
for British imports.
During World War II, the scope for emigration was again
reduced. The need to produce as much as possible at home, especially
food and fuel, the difficuity in acquiring or replacing machinery and equip-
ment, and the increase in the armed forces from 7, 500 in 1939 to a peak of
38, 000 in 1942, all helped to maintain emplosar~ent. In 1946, at the end of
the war, the level of total employment was much the same as it had been
20 years earlier.
.The Early Post-War Years
The major challenge to employment creation came with the
return to normality after the war. Britain was committed to a full employ-
ment policy, so that the deterrent to emigration no longer existed. In
agriculture, a large amount of labour had been bottled’up by the depression
of the 1930s and the war, and it was inevitable that the outflow from agri-
ctdture would be greatly increased. This could be only accentuated by the
reduction in the abnormally high tillage levels required during the war, and"
11.
by the availability of new machinery and labour-saving technologies. Industry
was also at a crossroads. Since the scope for new import substitution was
limited, it either had to seek markets abroad, or be confined to the growth
of the home market.
In the first five years after the war, economic policy responded
to this challenge with considerable success. A large and growing programme
of public capital expenditure was maintained, much of it devoted to building
and construction. This made sense, given the need for infrastructural
facilities and the high unemployment rate in the building industry. More-
over, the inevitably large outflow of unsldlled workers from agriculture could
often be absorbed most readily in building activities in the first instance.
It would be wrong, however, to think of public capital spending as having
been entirely "social": while there was substantial expenditure on houses,
hospitals and schools, there was also a significant volume of investment in
power, transport and communications. A high growth of home demand was
sustained; and employment in industry and services rose by almost enough
to match the very substantial rise in the numbers leaving agricultural employ-
ment. Important direct State initiatives in production were the establishment
of Bord na Mona. (1946) and Irish Steel (1947).
A major deficiency in the overall policy approach was the
delay in seeldng to secure a complementary development of exports, without
which the approach would ultimately become tmsustainable. But having said
that, it musL also be added that the policy of expansion was curtailed long
before it need have been, and well before any export measures were likely
to have had substantial effect. The 1949 devaluation and the Korem] War
caused a steep rise in import prices, and the balance of payments deterior-
ated sharply in 1950 and 1951. This led to restrictive budgetary measures
to restore the balance of payments position. In retrospect, it is clear that
a great part of the problem was due to external, rather than domestic,
factors. Moreover, the external difficulties proved to be temporary, and
the balmlce of payments was already on the mend even before the govern-
ment’s deflationary policies were intl.-oduced. Even when the balance of
payments situation was corrected, there was no return for most of the 1950s
to the expansionary policies that characterised the early post-war years.
On the contrary, during the 1956-58 dep,"ession, the public capital prog-
ramme was further cut back, especially as regards housing investment.
This approach was supported by the best economic advice
available to the government. The ol~ly major protest came from two people
12.
who would probably not regard themselves as economists, General Costelloe
and your own General Secretary, Ruaidhri Robez~ts.l The case made for
the cut-back in housing was that the resources thereby freed could be devoted
to more productive uses. General Costelloe and Mr Roberts, however,
argued that the circumstances of the time called for an increase, rather
than a decrease, in total public investment, and that such an increase would
be impossible if State investment in housing were reduced. Contrary to
the view that such investment must be deferred until economic growth had
accelerated, they argued that it should be "considerably expanded at times
such as the present and diminished when its continuailce would put a strain
upon the resources of the (building) industry". They drew attention to the
role of the building industry in generating economic growth, the damaging
consequences to that industry of Cutting back housing before other forms of
investment had been developed, and the difficulty of stimulating these other
investments in the conditions of depressed demand likely to follow from the
reduction in housing. They also stressed the importance of housing for
workers as a precondition to industrial and agricultural development and
diversification. Reviewing this debate in our book on post-war economic
r
growth, Brendan Dowling and I concluded that although these views "had
little influence at the time, in retrospect they appear to have been well
2
founded".
In the decade 1951-61, the numbers in agriculture continued
to fall rapidly, while industry and services, rather than offsetting this de-
cline, added further to it, resulting in a total net loss of 165, 000 jobs. The
building industry was particularly hard hit, with employment declining from
1951-58 by over one-third - from 86, 000 to 56, 000. While one may justly
regret the lost opportunities of the 1950s, however, it is important also to
remember that many important developmental measures were initiated then
which subsequently contributed significantly to expansion.in the 1960s.
These included the industrial development and tourist traffic acts, the in-
troduction of export tax relief, and the establishment of the Agricultural
Research hlstitute (1958). The objective of these and other developmental
measures was given a coherent expression in Dr Whitaker’s Economic
Development, which had a profound effect in restoring the shattered con-
fidence of the nation.
i. See Minority Report to Caj~ital hlvestment Advisory Committee,
Second Re_ op_9_
~, 
(Dublin: Stationery Office, 1957).
2. liieran A. Kemledy told Brendan R. Dowling, Economic Growth in
Ireland: the Exl~erience since 1947 (Dublin: Gill and h4acmillan, 1975).
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The Outward-Looking_Strategy
The experience of the 1950s was taken by many as proof
positive that protection did not work. Such a conclusion is open to question.
The more serious failures were the reluctance to expand public investment,
the discouraging effect on private investment of the resulting slow growth
of home demand, and the slowness in adopting measures later used to en-
courage exports. Protection could only be blamed for the debacle to the
extent that it acted as a disincentive to exports; and, recalling that there
was already freedom of access to the large U.K. market for most industrial
products, any such loss could have been cotmtered without sacrifice to the
contribution protection would hav..e made to the success of a satisfactory
domestic demand management policy.
The swing towards m~ out-ward-looldng strategy of develop-
ment Was intensified during the 1960s and early 1970s. There were uni-
lateral reductions in tariffs in 1963 and 1964, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Area Agreement came into operation in 1966 and Ireland joined the EEC in
1973. The Control of Manufactures Acts were fully repealed in 1964,
havh~g been modified in 1958, and efforts to attract foreign enterprise were
substantially enlarged. The period 1961-73 witnessed a rapid rate of
growth of national output, at over 4 per cent per annum on average, but
there was scarcely any change in the aggregate level of employment. The
fact that total employment did not expand despite acceleration in the rate
of output growth has led some to doubt whether economic growth can create
more jobs. This conclusion would not necessarily be correct, however.
During the period of more rapid growth there was an improvement in the
employment situation in the sense that it was no longer declining significantly
as it had been in the t950s; and it could be argued that had economic growth
accelerated still more, to about 6 per cent, this would have sufficed to
achieve full employment. Nevertheless, the failure to make progress to-
wards full employment despite an historically high growth rate does draw
attention to a point to which I shall return, namely that employment creation
may involve not only issues of growth but also redistribution of the fruits of
that growth.
One worrying feature about experience s’ince 1961 is that,
despite the greatly intensified concentration on industrial development and
the discovery of sttbstantial new mineral resources, there seems to have
been a progressive slowing down in the rate of increase in industrial employ-
ment - even before the current depression. Table 2~whi.ch gives the figures,
14.
Table 2
Cleanses in h~dustrial Emplo~Va1___ ~iou~s Periods~ 1961.-76__’
Average Annual Change in Thousands
1966-71 1971-74 1974-76
,, I 1961-66
Indus try 7.3 5.9 2.8 -9.0
Manufacturing 4.1 3.0 2.8 -6.0
°
Source: Census of Population Reports and Department of Finance,
Economic Review and Outlook, June 1977.
shows that this deceleration applied in manufacturing as well as in industry
as a whole. It is probable that free trade has been a contributing factor:
independent analyses confirm that both the Anglo-lrish Free Trade Area
Agreement m~d the EEC would, on balance, be adverse to employment,
unless there were significant dynamic benefits through, for instance, the
attraction of new investment.1
Certainly the advent of free trade, while it is not the only
factor involved, has made us familiar with the phenomenon of substantial
job losses and redundancies - something that the more open economy of
Northern Ireland has experienced for a much longer time. The losses
have greatly increased in the recent depression. IDA data suggest that,
in the six years 1971-76, i00, 000 jobs were lost in manufacturing, equal
to about half the total level of mantffacturing employment. By no means
all of the job losses can be attributed to the depression: in the th~ee years
1971-73, before the depression began at all, the IDA figures reveal a loss
of well over 30, 000 jobs. Moreover, as McAleese and Martin point out,
experience generally shows that there is a considerable time lag before
the full effect of free trade on jobs is felt;and, in their view, the Anglo-
Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, which came into effect in 1966, only
began to bite aroLmd 1970 onwards. This is ominous for the immediate
future, since only this year does the final instalment of the EEC tariff re-
duction take effect, so that there can be no assurance that job losses will
not continue on a sig~ificant scale. To the extent that job losses in some
indust1~ies ard caused by the same factors which encourage job creation in
other industries (e.g. the reciprocal removal of tariffs), then the losses
i. Dermot McAleese and John Martin, Irish Manufactured Imports from
the UK in the Sixties: The Effects of AIFTA (ESRI Paper No. 70, 1973); and
Dermot McAleese, "h-eland in the Enlarged EEC: Economic Consequences
and Prospects" in John Vaizey (ed.) l~e~.’io]ja]~..~ and Economic
So~c1~eio~ (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975).
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must properly be taken into accom]t in evaluating the effect of the indust~.~ial
development strategy. It is also worth pointing out that the job losses are
not confined to the old protected industries: there have also been significant
losses in grant-aided firms.
.4
NicAleese and Martin argue that the gains from free trade
"improve the standard of living of those who remain employed, but they
are not necessarily " ". Granted that employmentemployment-creating 1
has not benefited, why also do so ma~ny of those still employed feel that
their standard of living has not improved, or at least not improved as much
as they expected? Well whatever people may feel, the fact is that average
real gross earnings have increased very rapidly from the mid-1960s as the
move to free trade got under, way. From 1966 to 1973 average hourly
earnings in manufacturing rose in real terms (i.e. valued in terms of con-
sumer goods) by over 6 per cent per annum, and they even rose during the
currentdepression - at least up to the end of 1975. Though the message
may not be a palatable one to a trade union audience, it would be unwise to
neglect the possibility that such large incomes increases may be related,
both as a cause told m] effect, to the disappointing record of job creation.
These large incomes increases have been underpim]ed, if not actively in-
duced, by the structure of development incentives, such as capital grants
and accelerated depreciation allowances, which reward the replacement of
labour by capital, and ensure higher incomes for those lucky enough to hold
jobs.
In recent years, there has been a large rise in emplosa]]ent
in the public sector. Whereas employment in the rest of the economy fell
by well over 60, 000 (or about 7 per cent) from 1971-76, the number of
civil servants increased by over one-fifth, the security forces went up by
50 per cent and there have also been substantial increases in employment
in the health and education selwices. These increases have contributed
not only to the large increases in ~axation but, taken in conjunction with
other public sector expenditure~have pushed State borrowing to tmprece-
dented levels that could not be sustained for long. The rise in the numbers
in the security forces is largely a consequence of the Northern Ireland con-
flict, a factor, which has also seriously damaged employment in the tourist
industry. This industry was a significm]t contributor "to expansion in the
period 1957-69. ]lather thml continuing to expand after 1969, however,
real tourist earnings from foreign visitors in 1976 were over 25 per.
1. O p._cit., p.56.
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cent below the 1968 level. In addition, the home holiday trade has also
been hit by the vastly increased trend towards foreign hplidays by residents
of the Republic.
Finally, a word on recent employment trends related to
natural resources. In agriculture, the average am~ual percentage decline
over the period 1971-76 was much lower than in the immediately preceding
quinqummium 1966-71. The major reason for the slower rate of decline
was probably the absence of employment opportunities outside agriculture.
Hopes are sometimes expressed that the greatly increased prosperity in
agriculture may not only stem the outflow but even lead to increased employ-
ment there. Examination of the structure of agriculture, however, suggests
that the prospect is for continued decline, though at a much lower rate in
absolute terms than in the 1950s or 1960s. In 1971, one-third of all farms
were 30 acres or less, much lower than the Land Commission’s stated
objective of minimum size of 45 "adjusted" acres (i;e. the lm.ld equivalent
of 45 acres of good quality land). Moreover, on these small farms 30 per
cent of male proprietors and nearly half the female proprietors were aged
65 years a~nd over.
It is somewhat surprising, given the widespread public im-
pression of a mining boom, that there has been scarcely any increased
employment in this activity in the last five years; nor is there as yet any
evidence of increased employment in mineral processing. Although there
is also much public interest in the development of the fishing industry, the
long-term history of this industry has been one of decline: from 1926-71,
the numbers engaged halved, though no doubt many of those who left were
only engaged part-time. In 1971, the latest year for which detailed data
are available, the total employed was only 2½ thousand. The number en-
gaged in forestry is also small, and fell from 5, 000 in 1961 to 4, 200 in
1971. It would seem only realistic to conclude that the prospect of sub-
stantial new employment related to the exploitation of the country’s natural
resources depends chiefly on the development of processing activities, and
possibly the supply of inputs (such as machinery), rather than on the amotmt
of new jobs in the primary activity itself.
The net effect of the trends we have beeh discussing has
contributed to the historically high levels of unemployment experienced in
recent years, But another major factor influencing the unemployment
level has been the dampening effect on emigration of the depressed condi-
tions in Britain mid in the developed countries. It is possib].e also that the
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greatly improved mlemployment benefits - both absolutely and in relation
to average take-home pay -may have encouraged some to stay who in
earlier times, when benefits were less, would have emigrated. The rise
in benefits may also tend to raise the minimum wage that workers expect
to receive in employment.
III. Northern Ireland
Unlike the Republic of Ireland, total employment in Northern
Ireland is slightly higher now than at the begilming of the State. In 1974,
immediately before the present depression, aggregate employment was
about one-tenth higher than in 1926. The structure of the Northern Ireland
economy in the 1920s was very different from that in the Republic and this
partly explains the different overall emplosrment experience. Agriculture
than
accom~ted for less/one-third of total emplognent in Northern Ireland in
1926 as against more than one-half in the Republic. Even though agricul-
tural employment fell at a somewhat faster rate in the North, the loss as a
proportion of 1926 aggregate employment amom~ted to about one-fifth as
against one-third in the Republic. Or putting the same point another way,
the rate of increase in ~ricultural emplosa~ent in the North and in the
Republic over the last fifty years was very similar, hldeed, as may be
seen from Table 3, if we compare Northern Ireland with the province of
Leinster, there are remarkable similarities in their size, structure and
experience over time.
Table 3
Efi.ln_p!0yment in Northern Ireland and Leinster, 1926 and 1974
1926: N.I.
Leinster
1974: N.I.
1971: ]:~inster
All Sectors
Nos. (000)
505
459
555
538
Sectoral Shares (%)
Agriculture Industry
32 36
35 19
8 41
14 36
Services
32
47
51
50
Average Ammal Growth Rates (%)
1926-74: N.I. 0.2
1926-71: Leinster 0.4
-2.6 0.5 1.2
-1.7 1.8 0.5
Source: Northern Ireland: NI Census of Pol2ulation and D~:gst of Statistics.
An attempt has been made to adjust the or~g’,.nal 1926 data for com-
parability with the 1974 basis. Leinster: Census of Po.~ation:
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Whether we compare Northern Ireland with the Republic as
a whole or with Leinster, perhaps the most s trildng difference is the rela-
tive decline in its industrial predominance and the relative rise in its ser-
vices sector. In 1926, there were more industrial workers in the North
than in the whole of the Republic even though the overall labour force in the
Republic was 2½ times as great. By 1974, however, industrial
employment in the Republic was nearly one-fifth greater than in the North.
The change is even more marked in manufacturing. As recently as" 1951,
and despite the considerable increase in protected manufacturing industry
in the Republic, employment in manufacturing was about i0 per cent greater
in the North. But since 1951, the numbers engaged in manufacturing have
declined in the North and expanded in the Republic, so that by 1974 the total
engaged in manufacturing was nearly one-third greater in the Republic than
in the North. On the other hand, the numbers engaged in services have
increased much more rapidly in Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland’s manufacturing industry at the time of the
establishment of the State was dominated by three industries - linen, sMp-
building and engineering. All three were strongly export-oriented and,
therefore, substantially dependent on the vagaries of world demand and
international competition. These industries benefited from the boom in
activity during World War I but suffered in the depression following that
war, which was, however, short-lived. In fact, the linen industry was
prosperous during the 1920s with substantial exports of dress linen to the
United States. But the Great Depression which began in 1929 had disas-
trous consequences for Northern Ireland’s export industries. In the winter
of 1930, the number of unemployed linen workers in Belfast was nearly
20, 000; employment in the Belfast shipyards was down to 2, 000 in 1933
(from 20, 000 in 1924); and there was substantial unemployment in the
1
engineering industry. All told, in Belfast alone in the very bad years,
such as 1931 and 1938, about 50, 000 workers, or over one-quarter of the
labour force, were out of work.
Recovery from the depression was slow. The 1929 level of
employment in shipbuilding was not reached again for a decade, and then
only as part of the preparation for World War II. Linen never fully re-
covered as competition from cotton and synthetic fibres intensified. During
World War II and the immediate post-war years, manufacturing production
I. \¥. Black, "Industrial Change in the ’lhventieth Century" in J. C. Beekett
and R. E. Glasscock (eds.), Belfast: the Origin and Growth of an hidustrial
City (London: ]3. B.C., 1967).
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boon:ted and there was even a temporary recovery in the linen trade. But
since 1951, the trend of employment in manufacturing has been downward,
despite the government’s incentive programme for new job creation and the
attraction of foreign investment.. The linen trade suffered first in the early
1950s when the back-log of world demand for textiles was largely satisfied.
By 1974, employment in textiles as a whole was only about half the 1951
level. The fall in shipbuilding came in the 1960s and by 1974 employment
in shipbuiMing and marine engineering was only 10, 000 as against ~/ell over
20, 000 in 1961. As the Managing-Director of the Northern Ireland Develop-
merit Agency mentioned at this Course last year, the security situation in
Northern Ireland has reduced the inflow of foreign enterprise there to a
meagre triclde, and has also ea[~sed some existing firms to defer new in-
vestment or even locate it elsewlmre.l Adversity has been a stimulus to
self-help, however, and within the past five years or so about twenty new
industrial workers’ co-operatives have been formed, employing some 900
whole-time and 300 part-time.
The emplosqnent situation in Northern Ireland would be even
more serious were it not for the very substantial growth in services. The
growth in service employment has been particiarly high in the post-war
period - an average of about 3½ thousand per annum from 1951-1974, or
more than ~viee as great as in the Republic in the same period. The rise
has been predominmagly in public sector activities, notably health and edu-
cation. The ability to create so many such additional jobs, without recourse
to unbearable taxation or insupportable borrowing, is, of course, explained
by the fact that Northern Ireland was part of the richer economy of the U.K.
Thus, though Northern Ireland has suffered employment losses in some
sectors relative to the Republic because of its limited freedom to pursue
independent policies, it has been able to increase employment in other
sectors because of the ordinary fiscal redistribution mechanisms that apply
between the richer mad poorer regions within any country. This highlights
the dilemma for the Republic within the EEC in the absence of effective
regional policy. In many ways, the Republic is now as exposed as Northern
Ireland has been for the past fifty years, but without the benefit of com-
parable regional transfers for alternative employment creation.
In the course of the recent depression, manufacturing
emplo~nent has suffered severely, with a drop of nearly 20, 000 in the two
1. Ronald Henderson, "Structure and Role of a Development Corporation"
in Economic and Social Planntng~ proceedings of the ICTU Summer Course,
1.976.
20.
year period Jm~e 1974 to June 1976. This fall has been substantially off-
set, however, by the continued rapid rise in services, so that the aggregate
employment level fell only slightly. Nevertheless, unemployment has
risen sharply from 27, 000 in June 1974 to almost 60, 000 in June 1977, the
latter being the highest Jtme figure of the post-war period.
IV. Lessons from Past Experience
i. There is a temptation for generals to fight the last war without
regard to the fact that the new war may require different strategies. In
seeldng to draw useful lessons from the past, therefore, we must try to
keep in mind that a lesson emerging from one phase of history may be in-
applicable to a later phase because conditions have chszlged. Thus, for
example, while one may be justly critical of the restrictive demand manage-
ment policy of the 1950s, the position now is that, for good or ill, we are
committed to a policy of total free trade, hl such circumstances, though
it wou]d be going too far to say that expression of home demand will produce
no effect on employment, obviously there is a danger that a larger propor-
tion of any stimulus will simply spill over into imports. To the extent that
domestic demand measures are more circumscribed, competitiveness
assm~es enhanced importance.
2. The Irish economy displays many of the characteristics of
a semi-developed economy. But by reason of its location and history, it
aspires to a standard of living far greater than it has managed to afford
for all its people, a factor that limits its freedom of action in many ways.
Thus, the problem is not simply to create enough jobs: there are also high
expectations about the standard of living that should exist in Irelm~d. These
expectations are manifest in the incessant demands for higher pay, less tax
and more public services. They are not confined to trade unionists, but are
prevalent also among rummagers, farmers, the professions, and many other
interests now represented by vocal pressure groups. But the satis-
faction of such aspirations may for long conflict with the task of providing
jobs for all at home.
3. Irish society has in the past coped with its "labour surplus"
problem through emigration. Though this has alleviated the tensions that
would otherwise have arisen, i.t was by no men’ms a costless solution in
terms of the deadening effect on the remaining community. Moreover,
there is no assurance that l:his option will now be so open to us again. The
counl:ries of immigration are themselves suffezmg from structural unemploy-
ment problems, the nature of which is hnperfectly understood and which
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may prove difficult to solve. The willingness to emigrate may also be less,
due to changed attitudes and educational endowments. For the future, the
choice may lie between increasing employment, or supporting growing num-
bers in unemployment with all the social costs and risks involved.
4. If, as I believe, the basic problem has been and still is, one
of m~derdevelopment, then the traditional economic virtues - enterprise,
hard work and thrift - remain pre-eminently important. Of these, perhaps
the one that has been most deficient is enterprise. LooMng at the record
of the past, I doubt if we can afford the luxury of relying on one form of
enterprise to the exclusion of others. Not only do we need the contributions
of both State and private enterprise, but we might seek to develop new forms
of enterprise as well. In this con_nection, the recently mmounced Irish
Press Young Ireland Initiative Awards, desig~led to evoke l~ore enterprise
among the young, is a heartening move. I referred earlier to the still
small, but growing, number of industrial workers’ Cooperatives in Northern
Ireland, a fomn of enterprise that has been less evident in the Republic.
And might I also draw to your attention, hopefully for your consideration
during this Course, that trade tmion enterprise has been a major source of
development in Israel. Apart from its many affiliated co-operatives, the
trade m~ion movement there developed large industrial enterprises accounting
for nearly 20 per cent of the nation’s industrial value added and embracing
such industries as metals, chemicals, electronics mid construction. In
addition, the trade tmion movement operates one of the largest banks (with
over 200 branches) and has a virtual monopoly of bus transport. The basic
motivation underlying such enterprise was to help provide jobs directly for
the people rather than leaving the task solely to the government and private
industry. If, as trade tmionists, you believe that the task is one for the
State, then I might ask you to consider why you expect the State to be more
enterprising than the people fom~ning it, of whom trade union members rep-
resent a very considerable portion.
5. In seeldng to develop new enterprise, the home market - even
a small home market like Ireland - is of great importance in the initial
phases. As one writer put it, on the basis of experience in cotmtries
generally, e~porting is "the end, not the beginni~]g, of a typical market
expansion path".1 Even with free trade, a variety of factors, such as
transport costs, afford some protection to the new firm in trying to develop
1. S. Burenstam-Linder, An_Essa.3ion Trade and Transformation (New
York: Jolm Wiley, 1961).
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experience and reach a profitable level of production. It is important to
stress this because, in the current enthusiasm for free trade, opportunities
for horne market development may be neglected. From time to time, one
reads complaints in the press that Irish suppliers have failed to get domestic
contracts, not because they are uneornpetitive prieewise, but because they
had no previous experience. Such reports, if true, give cause for concern;
if the suppliers cannot be given experience at home, how can we expect
firms abroad to give them that experience. We might also look again at
the possibility of substituting home production for those imports which have
been growing rapidly in recent years. To take one example, in 1976 we
imported over £50 million of agricultural rnachinery as against only £12
million in 1971 - a substantial increase even allowhlg for inflation. Sorne
of the existing development incentives are not of much benefit to a new
native firm. In its forrnative years, such a firm may rnake little profit,
so that even if it is involved in exports, the export tax relief may be of
limited value; and if it is operating only on the horne market, this incentive
confers no benefit at all.
6. The analysis of the past suggests that job creation is con-
eerned with issues of distribution as well as issues of growth. Ireland is
not peculiar in this respect; indeed, I ]mow of no established school of
thought in econornics - classical, nee-classical, Keynesian or l~[arx[st -
that does no/adrnit the possibility, at least, of there beh~g a conflict between
increased ernplo3rn~ent and higher living standards for those with jobs. Yet,
it is not a message that any of the social partners will readily accept when
it is their own standard that is at stake. In recent years, seve1~al major
influences have intervened so as to rnake it very difficult to convince trade
true it rnav
unionists of the trade-off between wages and jobs, howeverfbe. The depres-
sion in world demand has reduced both ernplosanent and productivity growth,
involving highe].~ unemployment and a lower progression in real incomes.
l%([oreover, the operation of pay policy (e. g. national pay agreernents, equal
pay) in recent years when price inflation was high, has resulted in above
average real increases for some groups while other groups have suffered
real reductions. I have no doubt that many of the latter groups, rightly or
wrongly, resent the fact that their sacrifice has gone to narrow differentials
arnong the employed rather than to maintaining or increasing ernployrnent.
The erosion of relativities is upsetting to established patterns at any tirne:
when it happens in depressed conditions, it is liable to provoke far rnore
hostility among the losers than satisfaction a]nong the gainers. The hos-
tility is exacerbated by the fact that various classes of incon’~.es olltside the
national pay agreements (e.g. some of the professional self-employed) were
subject to no eon~parable discipline.
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7. Furthemnore, there have been three major influences -oiI
prices, farm prices and taxation - creating a disjunction between the real
wage as an income to the worker and the real wage as a cost to the indus--
trial employer. The real wage that is relewant for the employer in deciding
.on his employment level is the relation between the price of his own product
and the gross payment incurred in respect of an employee (including social
insurance contributions, superalmuation, ere). To the worker, on the
other hand, his real wage is the relation between take-home pay and’the
prices of the goods he buys. Now, when the price of oil mid other imported
commodities (such as coffee) rises so dramatically as in recent years, the
country as a whole is adversely affected. If workers receive full compen-
sation for such price increases, ’the effect on the real cost of labour to the
employer will tend to produce unemployment. The r~se in farm prices
poses the same dilemma, but the distributional implications are quite dif-
ferent. Whereas an oil price increase involves a national loss which cmmot
be escaped, the rise in farm prices represents a gain to one sector of the
commkmity - the farmers. A major part of the gain is on export sales,
which is of national benefit; but when export prices rise so also do domestic
prices, so that part of the farmers’ gain is at the expense of the urban com-
munity. Rising taxation has also substantially affected real take--home pay
of workers; and to the extent that they try to compensate for this, the
employers’ costs are raised with adverse implications for employment.
The employers’ labour costs have also been increased by the steep rise in
social insurance contributions, which represent a direct tax on employment
affecting particularly the labour intensive industries and lower paid
employment.
i,
i.
8. These issues of distribution are likely to remain
acute in the future. If support for the Common Agricultural Policy is to
be maintained among the Irish population, then it seems to me inevitable
that the primary gains must be shared more fairly among the community
as a whole, including be it said, the poorer farmers. If we desire to create
more employment in pubIic services, then this will have to be paid for by
the tax-payer. On the other hand, if pay restraint is to be sought by granting
tax concessions, this must inevitably involve a curb on public expenditure
which will be against the hlterests of some groups. Trade unions under-
standably ask why picas for pay restraint are directed primarily at them;
and, in my view, they are perfectly right in pressing for comparable res-
traint on other personal incomes and qn the profits of essentially sheltered
enterprises such as the bmlks. But: if they reject pay restraint in relation
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to themselves, then their moral authority in pressing for job creation is
seriously weakened. Trade unions also face the dilemma that if they seek
to curb profits in industries exposed to foreign competition there may be
insufficient incentive to m~dertake the necessary employment-creating in-
vestm.ent. But if they resent the fact that such profits accrue to capitalists
then, as I suggested earlier, it is open to them, like their Israeli comater-
parts, to engage in such activities themselves and reap the fruits for their
own 1Ytenlbe rs. . -
9. Official calls for pay restraint and thrift would be likely to
prove more effective were it not that so many official policies operate in
preciseiy the opposite direction. The move to free trade has increased
real incomes for some at the expense of employment for others. In prin-
ciple, the higher incomes generated by free trade could be reallocated to
create alternative jobs, but experience in recent years shows how difficult
it is to reclaim the gains from the initial recipients " Many of the develop-
ment incentives have a similar bias. Accelerated depreciation alIowanees
reward the replacement of labour by capital. Capital grants are designed
to increase employment but do so in a way that encourages high productivity/
high income activities which are liable to have adverse repercussions on
the competitiveness of other labour intensive activities. Capital is treated
as though its supply were m]lhnited, rather thin] as a scarce resource to
be devoted primarily towards maxin:tfsing emplosanent. Personal borrowing
is rewarded by tax concessions, while personal saving through any of the
normal media (such as government loans, bank deposits, etc) does not earn
any real rate of return - indeed it yields a substantial real loss. Lip set-
vice is no substitute for well designed policies; and policies that
run comater to stated objectives are liable to generate cynicism.
t
10. Distributional questions are also implicit in the debate on
whether or not Ireland should break the link with sterling. This is a sub-
jece on which there is much public confusion, and even though I camtot
attempt a full treatment here of the pros and cons, I would like to put a
few basic points on record. An appreciation of the currency vis-a-vis
sterling would help to secure greater price stability. But it camaot ae the
same time help to expand employment; on. the contrary, it would be un-
favourable to employment until such time as the rate of increase in money
incomes were reduced sufficiently to match the new exchange rate, It is
mflikely that this would take place immediately so that there would be, at
a minimum, a tra.nsitional phase during which maintenance or expansion
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of employment would be harder, while the real income of those in jobs would
tend to rise. It is, in fact, interesting that in the debate on changing the
currency, concern with price inflation has predoi~inated over concern with
unemployment: this is probably no more than another illustration of the tin-
willingness of those with secure jobs to accept a reduction in their own
standard of living in the interests of new employment. Certainly, if we
were contemplating the use of the exchange rate to help employment creation,
we would be thintdng in terms of ~reciatio_n, rather than an appreciation,
e
¯ Loof the currency. Of course, I should hasten to add that d precla~on provides
no lasting encouragement to increased employment if it is quicldy eroded by
compensating incomes increases. In making these points, I do not wish to
be understood as ruling out the use of the exchange rate as an instrument of
policy. Rather, my purpose is simply to emphasise tl{at in embarldng on
such a course we should be clear, first, about the objectives we wish most
to attain, and, second, that exchange rate policy cannot achieve the desired
objectives m~less accompanied by more fundamental actions, such as appro-
priate res:traint in incomes, h~deed, we need look no further than Britain
to see that an independent currency is no guarantee in itself against price
inflation or unemployment.
Ii. In conclusion, the overriding lesson emerging from Irish
experience - as indeed from the experience of any country in the course of
its development, be it China or the United States - is that there is no sub-
stitute for the basic economic requirements of enterprise, hard work and
thrift. True, we can draw widely different conclusions about how these
forces are best mobilised and their fruits most fairly shared. But in con-
sidering alternative approaches, let us not delude ourselves that there is
any effective way of creating enough jobs for all except through our own
efforts a~Id sacrifices.
